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RUSSIA, THE REVOLUTION AND THE WAR

An Account of a Visit to Petrograd and Helsingfors in March, 1917

BY

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CONTENTS

Preface ................................................................. ii
Nearing Historic Events ........................................... 1
The Journey to Russia ............................................ 1
Petrograd at Night ................................................ 3
Causes of the Revolution ......................................... 6
The Duma .............................................................. 8
Keryenski .............................................................. 11
Chief Factors of the Present Situation ........................... 12
The Workmen's and Soldiers' Council ............................ 14
The Army ............................................................. 15
Problems of the Future ............................................. 17
The Constituent Assembly .......................................... 17
The Agrarian Problem .............................................. 18
Finland ............................................................... 20
Poland ............................................................... 21
Problems of War and Peace ....................................... 22

Publications of the Endowment
PREFACE

Dr. Christian L. Lange of Christiana has been since the establishment of the Carnegie Endowment a valuable correspondent of the Division of Intercourse and Education. His experience in the public life of Norway, his service as a member of the Second Hague Conference, and his work as permanent secretary of the Interparliamentary Union have given him not only a wide acquaintance with international politics and with European statesmen, but unique opportunities for observing and for studying them.

In December, 1916, and still more markedly in January, 1917, there were signs that something important and significant was going on behind the scenes in Russia. The apparent paralysis of Russia’s military and economic organization and effort required explanation, and the rapidly growing rumors of coming political changes called for more accurate knowledge and fuller interpretation. Under these circumstances Dr. Lange was requested by cable to proceed as promptly as might be to Russia in order to make to the Endowment a full and accurate report upon the political, economic and military situation in that country. It is doubtless fortunate that Dr. Lange was not able to undertake this mission until after a delay of several weeks, for in consequence he reached Russia just as the storm of revolution broke and so was able to see with his own eyes and to hear with his own ears the events which mark one of the greatest and most sudden political changes in all history.

The value of Dr. Lange’s report is so great that the Division of Intercourse and Education has given it the widest possible publicity. It will stand as a permanent and authentic record of the happenings of fateful days in March and April, 1917.

Dr. Lange’s report was completed and forwarded from Christiana before April 20, 1917. It is a striking tribute to his clear-sightedness and sagacity that the events which immediately followed have confirmed in many respects the analysis and the predictions he then made. It is profoundly to be hoped that his favorable forecasts of the future will be similarly sustained by the happenings of the next few weeks.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER,
Acting Director.

June 4, 1917.
RUSSIA, THE REVOLUTION AND THE WAR

An Account of a Visit to Petrograd and Helsingfors in March, 1917

BY DR. CHRISTIAN L. LANGE

Nearing Historic Events

It was a most fortunate chance that I had planned my trip to Russia for the middle of March. As it happened, I arrived at Petrograd by the first train to pass the Russian frontier after the revolution, on the evening of Saturday, March 17, two days after the formation of the Government and after the abdication of the Tsar, the day after the abdication of the Grand-Duke Michael, the Tsar's brother, an event which made Russia for the time being a republic.

I left Christiania on March 12, when as yet nothing was known at all about what was going on at Petrograd. At Stockholm, where I stopped for Tuesday and Wednesday to meet the Interparliamentary Group of the Riksdag, I read telegrams about the riots in the Russian capital; I also learned of the adjournment of the Duma. Competent persons, however, advised me to go on, as they firmly believed that the telegrams were fantastic and exaggerated. This also proved true. The papers had spoken of a bridge across the Neva having been blown up, of Petrograd swimming in blood. All this was partly fantastic rumors, partly intentional perversion. It is needless to say that I was anxious to go myself, as I was sure at any rate to meet my political friends in Russia, and it might even be supposed that most interesting events were developing. When in September last Mr. Milyukoff was at Christiania, he told me that a revolution was inevitable. The only questions were: when was it to come? how would it be possible to coordinate a revolution with the exigencies of the war?

My tickets were taken, sleepers and all, and I thought it best at any rate to go to the frontier and take counsel there.

The journey to Russia is now very long, the Baltic being impassable. One has to go north by rail for forty hours. I left Stockholm Wednesday, March 14, in the afternoon, and only Friday morning I reached the frontier at Haparanda. In the train I had already seen the first communication from the Executive Committee of the Duma that they had seized the reins of Government, that the Tsar's ministers were in prison, that the Petrograd garrison had
joined the Duma, and that the town was quiet. The Russian consul at Haparranda advised me to go on, but warned me at the same time that it might be difficult to reach Petrograd according to the time-tables. This, however, was not considered as serious, and I crossed the river in a sledge—there is no railway connection—the temperature being at \(-40^\circ\) F. \((-40^\circ\) C.). As there was no wind, the cold was much less biting than later at Petrograd, where the temperature was \(+5^\circ\) F.

At Torneå, the Finnish railway terminus, we were examined by the Russian gendarmerie as usual at European frontiers during the war. I had a laisser-passer from the Russian Minister at Christiania, and was not even searched, and I heard from my fellow-travelers that their examination had also been very lenient. The people at the station knew less of what had passed at Petrograd than we did. They had not seen the first communiqué, and the Finnish woman, who kept the book-stall at the station, was delighted when I slipped a Swedish paper to her, which gave the text of the document.

The exceptional events and the feverish excitement with which we anticipated the rest of our journey soon dissolved the reserve which more or less estranges fellow-travelers, especially in war-time, when you read everywhere: "Beware of strangers. Enemy ears are listening to every word!" And we soon formed one single discussion club, when we found ourselves in the sleeping car: a couple of Finns, a Russian customs officer from the Chinese frontier, who had been prevented by the submarines from seeing his wife and family at Geneva, and now had to return to Charbin, an American lawyer and his wife going on business to Russia, the American consul and vice-consul from Tiflis on their way to their posts, a French diplomatic courier, some four or five Norwegians and some gentlemen of indeterminable nationality and characteristics. The first great question was: were we to reach Petrograd? The next morning we learned that we had passed the express from Petrograd during the night. This gave hope. But at the same time strange rumors were circulating: that there were new disturbances and strikes at Petrograd, bloodshed at Helsingfors, and a railway-strike in Finland. At last, early in the afternoon, I got an Abo paper containing the full official report from the new Government, its composition and program, and—through a chance word in a reported speech of Milyukoff's—the first intimation of the abdication of the Tsar. During more than an hour I had to sit and translate these historic documents to my foreign friends.

There was great elation but still anxiety, as we steamed southwards. We were never sure, on reaching one station, we would get beyond it. However, we got to Viborg, the last considerable town on the Finnish side. Were we to pass the frontier, too? It was already late at night when we steamed into the station of Bielo-Ostrov, where the customs and passport examination takes place. Some Russians had come on board the train, and they confirmed the reports of mutiny among the marines at Kronstadt and at Helsingfors. Hor-
rible things had been going on. A young naval officer told us his life had been threatened. "But I was popular with my men, so there was no serious danger for me." He carried the red badge of the revolution, but it was evident that in his heart of hearts he did not really like it.

Our excitement reached its pitch when we slowly came up to the platform at Bielo-Ostrov. We were standing ready with our bags, luggage tickets, passports and everything; the platform was empty, not a human being to be seen. Then all of a sudden, the carriage door opens, enters a little dwarf, no taller than my writing-desk, and he cries out as he rolls down along the corridor: "Liberty is supreme. All the gendarmes are sent to prison to Petrograd. No more passports, no customs. Only liberty reigns!"

He was our herald of the revolution! And he proved right. The train left at once, without any examination at all, and within two minutes we all carried, God knows how, red badges in our buttonholes. I got mine from the carriage maid, who tore asunder a piece of red flag cloth and freely distributed the pieces, and she at once became very communicative: there had been a strike for some hours on the railway lines, a strike of pronounced political character. The men had insisted on the removal of some high Russian officials in the railway administration. As soon as they had obtained satisfaction, they returned to work. This accounted for the delays we had had and still had.

**Petrograd at Night**

At half past twelve we were at the end of our journey. I had myself wired to a hotel, and the Russian Minister had wired through his Department, that I should be met at the station and get accommodations at a hotel—they are all more than full—but nobody was there to meet me (I later learned that no wires had arrived) and what was worse, there were no taxis, not even a single horse and sledge. I was most glad to join the Russian customs officer, who also was on the lookout for a room, and he moreover took under his care a young American electrician, on his way home to the States by Vladivostok and San Francisco. We three started together from the Finnish station, which is on the western bank of the Neva (no bridge had been blown up) in the outskirts of the town, close to the industrial quarters, where the revolutionary movement began.

The city was altogether quiet. We met some soldiers patrolling the streets; here and there we saw groups of young students with white bands round the left arm, bearing in red the letters G. M. (Militia Guard) and a gun thrown across the shoulder. Once or twice we met some persons returning from a dinner-party. Otherwise the streets were as if dead, not a horse and carriage, nor a tram. When we had crossed the great bridge, we saw the dreary ruins of the big police court on the Lieteny Prospect (one of the main thoroughfares). It had been burnt, but otherwise no traces of destruction were to be seen thus far.
The popular exasperation had turned against the police and its headquarters. Unfortunately some very important documents were destroyed at the same time: not only the états civils, the registers of the population, their age, status and so on, but also the archives of the secret police have been destroyed in part, so it is now one of the difficult tasks of the new administration to trace the agents provocateurs, who were everywhere. I heard later from Mr. Keryenski, the Minister of Justice, that not only was one of the editors of the Pravda (Truth) the organ of the extreme socialists, in the pay of the Okhrana, the secret police, but that the police had also one of their representatives on the Central Committee of the Cadets, Milyukoff’s party. A sharp pruning knife will be necessary to remove this excrecence with all its ramifications from Russian life.

We called at every hotel, at any boarding house which was indicated to us; impossible to find a room, or even an easy-chair. The explanation of this fact is that so many refugees from Poland, lately also from Roumania, have filled the hotels; some of the bigger ones have also been turned into hospitals. After two hours of weary wanderings, a militia-man took pity on us and led us to a room in a highly “modest” hotel which served as a sort of resting-place for the patrols. There I passed the rest of the night in a corner of a sofa, while the two others with a courage I could not muster lay down on a most suspicious looking bed.

When we turned out early in the morning, in bitter cold, it proved impossible to find breakfast. No coffee-houses were open, no bakers’ shops, no restaurants; even the lunch counters in the railway station were closed, so we had to walk on without any tea or coffee. As we walked back towards the station to find our luggage, we saw men, women and children lining up before the bakers’ shops or the victuallers’. On that day the victualling was very difficult. I got lunch at noon, but not a crust of bread before. The next morning, after having found a hotel at 6 p.m. on Sunday, after much searching and many a weary walk, I got for my breakfast a pot of coffee with sugar, but no milk, and one single piece of black bread, and that piece not a large one, fifty or sixty grammes.

But it should be said at once that matters improved very quickly. Partly because the scarcity of food was artificially created by the late Government, partly because the new administration made an extraordinary effort to feed Petrograd, matters soon returned to their normal level. I was told in Finland that there were four meatless days a week in Russia. As a matter of fact, I had meat every day during my fortnight’s stay, and both at lunch and dinner, and there was no difficulty after a few days in having bacon with the breakfast eggs, if I preferred. In the hotels I saw only black bread, but in private houses I had white bread. The prohibitive regulations were still in force, in the hotels no wines, and still less spirits, were to be had. I know that there were great difficulties in finding wine in bottles for private persons.
But prices were very high, more than double those prevailing at my former visits to Petrograd (in 1910 and in February, 1914). To a certain extent this rise is balanced to foreigners by the serious depreciation of Russian money. Here in Norway the exchange on Petrograd is somewhere between 55 and 60 per cent of the normal exchange. Paper money is flooding the country, and during my whole stay I had not one single Russian coin in my hand, not even a copper. I once saw some copper and even one silver coin in the purse of an istvostsjik. I have in my possession as souvenirs paper notes of one, two, three and five copecks. They are 5 x 8 cm., but for ten, fifteen and twenty copecks stamps without gum were used instead of coins. It is evident that the peasants are hoarding the coins; they think them more valuable than the paper, of which from bitter experience they are distrustful. In Finland smaller coins were used, while, from one mark upwards, paper notes were most to be seen. (Finland has its own currency system [a mark = one franc]). It is said that several foreigners are buying up Russian notes, speculating in the rise of the currency when the crops which are now being hoarded for want of export facilities, will be thrown on the foreign market.

During Sunday I succeeded, as already said, in finding provisional hotel accommodation, but rather out of the way, and I was promised a room on Tuesday at one of the better hotels in the central part of the town. As I walked along the Nevsky during the afternoon, I met a procession of workmen, soldiers and women, singing the revolutionary hymn—an old song I was told—sung to a tune evidently borrowed from the Marseillaise, but in rather a depraved setting. The text may be rendered as follows:

Let us give up the ancient world.
Let us shake its dust from our feet.
We want no idol in gold.
We hate the palace of the Tsars.
We will go to our suffering brethren,
We will go to those who are starving.
With them we execrate the felon,
And we will challenge him to fight.
March, march, workmen, forward!

The procession carried red banners on which was written: “Land and Liberty,” “Down with Autocracy,” etc. It was a revolutionary sight, but at the head of the procession in the very middle of the street I saw a strange sight: high up on a car drawn by a horse a man was standing, turning, turning incessantly his cinematograph preparing his “films of the Russian revolution.” Then I understood that I was really a witness of historic events, but also that all danger was passed. Petrograd had settled down to civilized life.
CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION

I do not intend to give here a chronological summary of the revolutionary events. I presume they will be pretty well known. I shall rather try to give an analysis of the revolution as I was able to realize it, on the basis of personal observation on the spot, of conversations with political leaders, diplomats, journalists, ordinary citizens, and readings in the press. As soon as I had settled down in my hotel, I engaged a young woman student, who came every morning to translate the papers to me, as I do not read Russian myself. I was most fortunate in this respect. She was a wide-awake, intelligent person, was studying history and politics at the university, and her husband was on the staff of the Rietch, Milyukoff's organ, so I had an excellent opportunity of learning many things through her, of which otherwise I should have remained ignorant. On the other hand, I had several means of corroborating this information.

I have already said that the revolution was inevitable. I remember very well that when at Petrograd in February, 1914, I was told by Milyukoff that the Tsar Nicholas had une peur bleue de la guerre, because he very well realized that there had been an intimate connection between the war with Japan and the ensuing revolution of 1905-06. This dread of the Tsar's was in Milyukoff's eyes one of the guarantees of European peace, at any rate a security against aggressive tendencies on the part of Russia. On the other hand, there was then in Russia great apprehension of German and Austrian aggression, especially in connection with the negotiations which were to come as to the renewal of the Russo-German treaty of commerce, which was to expire in 1917. War with the Central Powers was considered as inevitable, and it may have served as an argument for war in 1914 that now Russia at any rate had strong allies.

I was told now in 1917 that there had been divided counsels in the Government of 1914. The majority of the ministers favored war, a minority represented by Sazonoff, and the ministers of Finance and of Agriculture, Bark and Kriwoshein, were for peace, and the Rietch, which supported the peace policy of Sazonoff, was even prohibited for a time. The Tsar was as usual vacillating; fits of seeming restIVENESS alternated with periods of complete apathy, and as it happened his peur bleue de la guerre had no decisive importance. Sazonoff was, however, at any rate able to take up an attitude which left the responsibility of aggression with the other side. But there is no doubt also that at Petrograd—as indeed in all capitals—there was a military party pushing towards war. The responsibilities for the war are divided, European, but they should evidently be apportioned in different degrees.

But when the war came, it was immensely popular in Russia. Slavonic nationalism, which was an important element in aristocracy and among the great land owners, turned against Austria-Hungary and Germany, who were bent on crushing the Slavonic sister state, Servia. The progressive elements saw the
immense importance of the dissolution of the league of the three emperors, formed around the *pactum turpe* of the partition of Poland, and which had held good for upwards of a century and a half, and no less the great potentialities which might flow from the alliance with Western democracy. Their hopes were high during the first year of the war, as letters from Efremoff and from Milyukoff at that time testify. They saw in Germany the stronghold of reaction and of militarism in Europe, and trusted that its downfall would be followed by that of Russian autocracy. It has happened otherwise. But at any rate this feeling created a widespread sense of responsibility for the war, of the necessity of supplementing, as far as in them lay, the shortcomings of the administration and of the bureaucracy.

Thus was called into being a spontaneous participation in the war work from the best and most healthy elements within Russian society. The Association of the Zemstvo’s on one side, a voluntary institution formed by the members of the municipal councils of the "Governments," consequently by men versed in local government and in public affairs, combined with the leaders of the great commercial and industrial enterprises to form all sorts of committees outside the administration. In a hundred ways they have been able to help and to prove their efficiency. When Brussiloff prepared his great offensive, he had of course to secure his rear. Trenches were to be dug for the eventuality of a retreat. But he could not use his own soldiers, as their offensive force might be snapped, if they knew that positions were prepared for a retreat. Then the Association of the Zemstvos at once mobilized 500,000 peasants, who did the work. Another general complained that his companies were suffering because so many soldiers were called off to become cooks. In a very short time 50,000 men, not fit for military work, but able to do service as cooks, were put at his disposal. In innumerable ways the industrial committee has helped to organize the importation of munitions and of raw materials for the war industries.

Quietly the direction of Russian life and activity during the war was more and more taken over by the middle class itself, and their services appeared all the more brilliant against the dark setting of the incapacity, the corruption, not to mention the occasional treason, of the old administration. It is, so to speak, the leaders of this activity who have now undertaken also the nominal direction of Russia. The new premier, Prince Lvoff, was President of the Association of Zemstvos. Gutchkoff, Minister of War, Konovaloff, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Chingareff, Minister of Agriculture, have all played leading or prominent parts in the different organizations and committees controlling and leading the private activity for the war, while Milyukoff, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has represented the Russian people before the world, through his work in the press or through his numerous addresses abroad during the war. A new official Russia was silently in formation. It has now risen, shaking off the feeble fetters Tsardom, bureaucracy and police were trying to lay on a people pre-
pared to work out its own salvation, while the powers of old manifestly proved incapable of their task.

**The Duma**

It is impossible to rate highly enough the importance and the influence of the Duma in this silent preparation of the momentous revolution of 1917. If a better horoscope is undoubtedly to be cast for this revolution than for its predecessor of 1905-06, it is chiefly because the Duma, through its existence alone, has educated Russian public opinion towards common national aims. In the Duma the Russian nation has found a common symbol, and through the speeches there, especially now during the war, the silent desires and hopes of the masses and of the classes have found expression and distinct objects for a national policy for a separate peace with Germany, Efremoff, leader of the Progressives here. When Milyukoff had made his famous attack on Sturmer, an attack which led to the Minister's fall and to the abandonment for the time being of the policy for a separate peace with Germany, Efremoff, leader of the Progressives—an intermediary party between the Octobrists and the Cadets, these latter not by far a radical party,—made a speech in which he said: "There is little use in removing the mushrooms from a rotten trunk, they will sprout again, as soon as weather favors. The only efficient cure is to cut down the rotten trunk." This is pure revolutionary doctrine. And Keryenski, now Minister of Justice, once took for his text the famous sculptural groups on the Anitchkoff bridge on the Nevsky, representing four tamers of horses in different attitudes. He said: "In the first group you see the tamer dominating his horse; in the second and third groups, the horse is more and more freeing itself from its master; in the fourth group the man is on the ground under the hoofs of the horse, who is galloping freely along. The tamer is the bureaucracy, the horse is the Russian people. It will know how to obtain its liberation."

It would be a great mistake to think that the Fourth Duma was anything resembling a revolutionary assembly. As will be known the reactionaries and nationalists, together with the center, formed a solid majority against any evolution even towards parliamentary government; even the Octobrists were against ministerial responsibility. But so glaring was the incapacity of the old régime that a bloc was formed during the war by all the bourgeois parties, from the Cadets to the nationalists, which united on the single aim of pushing on the war and silently preparing for the moment when the catastrophe of Tsarism was to come. The reactionaries dwindled down to insignificance. Even the notorious Purishkevitch, who took service in the army, joined the bloc, and the still more notorious Markoff was pictured in a cartoon sitting sulking in his corner, as the "only Russian conservative." This was long before the revolution. The Cadets had to make sacrifices in order to keep this bloc together. Thus they voted, and...
Milyukoff himself spoke, against a proposal to raise the question of ministerial responsibility before the Duma. "The time was not ripe." Milyukoff's attitude then impaired his popularity with the radical elements, and this fact together with his imperialistic attitude with regard to the objects of the war, may compromise his position. As a matter of fact he is rather isolated in the Government. But the bloc was maintained, and the way paved for a united advance, when the moment of action was to come.

It is doubtful whether the Duma would ever have taken an initiative of revolution, but the fact that even Rodzianko, the moderate Octobrist president of the Duma, was ready to take the chair in the new Executive Committee; that the still more conservative Shulgin was ready to go with Gutchkoff to force Nicholas to abdicate, shows how far the conviction of the necessity of a profound change had spread. Everybody saw that a catastrophe was coming. But they did not know when. Would it be during the war or would it be after? Nobody was able to tell. But they saw the necessity of preparation, of mobilization for the eventualty, so to speak. The Executive Committee was secretly formed; even the ministers were designated long ago. Therefore the decisions could be made quickly when the supreme moment arrived.

Tsardom took upon itself to force matters to an issue. Nicholas Romanoff will probably figure in history as no less a tragical personality than Louis XVI. Indeed there are several points of resemblance. But above all they are like in having had consorts whose influence became fatal to them; both partook of the intense unpopularity their wives had incurred. The Empress Alexandra has not been wasteful and extravagant as was Marie Antoinette; but her connection with the notorious Rasputin, to whom in her hysteria she became quite submissive, sapped the last remnants of loyalty to the dynasty. Rasputin's corpse was buried in the Imperial park at Tsarskoie Selo, and I was told that when the corpse had been removed to be burnt—in order to put an end to this sordid story and to any attempt at beatification of the "Starest"—an Ikon (a Saint's image) was found with the corpse, on the back of which were written the names: Alexandra, Olga, Tatyana, etc.,—the whole of the family.

But the supreme trait of similarity between the two ill-fated queens is their "enemy connection"; Marie Antoinette "l'autrichienne," Alexandra the German, female cousin of Wilhelm, the Kaiser. And unfortunately there is no doubt that the Tsaritsa's "enemy connection" was far from innocent. She has not only been active in all the tentative efforts for a separate peace; but I was told in diplomatic circles that on one occasion an offensive movement, fully prepared, had been stopped by a telegram signed by her name. A wireless was in function at Tsarskoie Selo, corresponding with Nauen.

Anybody can see how all this must have killed the last remnants of loyalty,
already undermined by the notorious incapacity of the administration to cope with the problems of the war. The continual changes of ministers proved the vacillation at the head of affairs. Tsarism was evidently tottering to its fall. 

*Quem Deus perdere vult, prius dementat.* The Government, in an act of sheer desperation, added open provocation to its glaring faults and shortcomings. By stopping the transport of food to Petrograd, it intended to call forth riots in the capital; they were to serve as pretexts for an adjournment of the Duma, for the creation of a practical dictatorship, probably in the hands of Protopopoff or of a “strong” general, and lastly for the conclusion of a separate peace. Efremoff told me that one was on the track of a telegram to this effect: “Almost all transports to Petrograd stopped. Everything goes well.” Under it the signature of a minister.

The form which the provocation took called in the element which made the revolution. The Duma would perhaps have been capable of a *coup d’État*—and Efremoff told me that in fact this had always been the favorite hypothesis,—only the proletariat are willing to pay with their lives. And the proletariat found an associate in the garrison of Petrograd. These two facts are of capital importance; the latter gave the victory to the revolution; both together determined the democratic character of the events, and it seems as if this characteristic has come to stay. The democratic elements have been very strong in the revolution itself, and these forces are organizing themselves in order to maintain their influence.

The troops at Petrograd combined with the workmen, refused to shoot on the people and turned their guns against the police. The explanation of this extraordinary fact is to be found in the composition of these troops. They were not real garrison soldiers; they were partly older reserve soldiers, recently called to the colors after having passed years in their villages, partly young recruits who had not yet undergone the influence of the barracks. They were really a peasant democracy, who through their stay in the regiments had developed a certain class feeling, not as soldiers, but as peasant laborers having interests in common with the Petrograd proletariat, among whom many of them probably have found friends or relatives from their own villages. When ordered to fire on the people, they immediately protested and fired on the police instead. And the two popular forces then turned to the Duma, as the representative of the Russian nation, asking the national assembly to take the lead which had fallen from the hands of the Government.

In order to cooperate, the soldiers and workmen organized their Council, to which each regiment and each factory sent a delegate. Through an executive committee and a delegation, they opened negotiations with the Duma, whose Executive Committee, as stated above, was ready to act.
The central figure in this situation became the Duma member for Saratoff, Keryenski, a young barrister. This remarkable man is the leader of the "revolutionary socialists,"—in so far a misnomer, as they are revolutionary only as the word applies to the method of their action. As long as the autocracy existed, they approved of terroristic attempts. After the revolution, they declared for parliamentary action and popular propaganda alone, and one of Keryenski’s first decrees as Minister of Justice has abolished capital punishment. In their program they can hardly be said to be socialists; it is rather an agrarian party, aiming at the creation of a class of small proprietors, and most of their adherents are peasants and land laborers, while the workers of the towns rally round Cheidze, who is an orthodox Marxist, and whose program appeals to the industrial working man.

Keryenski has been the link between the bourgeois Duma and the soldiers' and workmen’s delegates. Through his unique eloquence and moral courage, he has been able to exert an enormous influence during these first difficult weeks, and the continued success of the revolution will to a very large extent depend on his personal authority. It is therefore a matter of very grave concern that his health is far from good. He is suffering from tuberculosis of the kidneys, one of which has been removed—alas very late; for the Russian surgeons had not discovered what was really the matter; it was during a visit to Finland that the very serious state of his health was discovered and the necessary operation undertaken.

He is sitting in the new Government as the representative, but at the same time as the hostage, of democracy. It would be most difficult to find a substitute, and every well-wisher for Russia will hope and pray that he may be spared for the great mission awaiting him. He made an extraordinary impression on me during my conversation with him; a soul of fire, sincere and truthful to himself, at the same time a powerful intelligence, and a born leader. His powers of work are said to be extraordinary.

His associates in the Government are all exceptionally able men,—perhaps with one exception, Tereshtshenko, the Minister of Finance. He is quite a young man, hardly thirty, a multi-millionaire from Kieff, owner of a big industry created by his father. He has been selected, partly at any rate, because he represents the Ukrainians, while all the other ministers are Great Russians, as the endings of their names show.

Most of the ministers are Cadets: Milyukoff, Rodicheff, Minister for Finland, Shingaryeff, Nekrasoff, Minister for Communications,—the latter the most advanced radical. The premier, Prince Lvoff, and Professor Manuiloff, Minister of Public Instruction, also belong rather to this party, while Konovaloff is a Progressive, Gutchkoff and Godneff, the Comptroller General, are Octobrists,
and V. N. Lvoff, the procurator of the General Synod, is standing still more towards the right. There is nothing radical nor subversive about this government. As already remarked, it has rather an imperialistic element in Milyukoff and Gutchkoff. But by the irresistible force of events they are pushed towards a pronounced democratic policy and towards a republican constitution. They see, for the time being, no other solution; their adherence must be considered as quite sincere, but it is probably not without a certain regret and apprehension that they look towards the future. And their attitude will probably be still more skeptical, when the big social problems will be at issue, especially the agrarian question.

The big crown with the imperial eagle which adorned the facade of the Winter Palace was first covered by the revolutionary red cloth—now the national color; some days later it was wholly removed, a small red flag on a little stick figuring in its place. No return to monarchy should be possible.

**Chief Factors of the Present Situation**

The first question which offers itself in this connection is whether there is any possibility of reaction. Is Tsardom deeply rooted in the Russian people? Will the nobility, will the army, will the clergy, will bureaucracy, rally round it, and will they be able to exercise any influence on the masses? Dr. Emmanuel Nobel, the nephew of the famous inventor and donator, and now head of the big house Fréres Nobel, an able man with a very wide outlook, said to me: "There are no other people mourning for the Tsar than those who were drawing pensions from the civil list, and perhaps some sentimental old women." This may be a somewhat extreme statement. But it really seems as if Tsardom's roots have been torn loose to an extraordinary degree. It is of course possible that if the "classes," the vested interests, are exposed to very harsh treatment in the course of the next few years, they may then rally round a sort of legitimist banner. But there are no signs that the monarchists will be able to muster another Vendée, or that a Russian Malesherbes will stand forth—if need be,—to defend his late master.

The nobility, the great land owners, must of necessity look with misgivings to the future; the agrarian problem can not be solved without some sacrifice on their part. But Tsardom has not always been working in their exclusive interests either. Alexander the Second's liberation of the serfs, Stolypin's land laws attacked their immediate interests. They will form a conservative element, but they are not sure to be legitimists.

As to the army, the incapacity and the treason of the dynasty during the war have put an end completely to loyalty in the ranks, and also among the officers. Not only the Petrograd garrison but also the army as a whole, is first of all patriotic, anti-German. And the dynasty has been known as pro-German.
A foreigner, especially one who has been living in a Roman Catholic country like Belgium, will anxiously ask concerning the influence of the clergy, both with respect to their feelings for the old order of things, and with regard to their influence on the villagers, more especially on the peasant women, if the Republic were to give them a vote. The Russians had no misgivings in this direction. It is true that the clergy of an established and endowed Church have always had the greatest respect for "the powers that be," and it may not therefore be so surprising that, immediately upon the abdication of the Tsar Nicholas, the clergy bowed to the new Government and left his name and that of his family out of the prayers in all Russian churches; instead came threefold prayer for Holy Russia.

The telegraph is a wonderful discipliner of a nation. There are no longer lost corners of a country where the past may linger, forgotten and unobserved for years, awaiting the favorable opportunity for a rush for power again. On the other hand, the confessional, this stronghold of the Roman Catholic Church, does not play any important part at all in Russia: the priest would never, according to the Russians themselves, be able to play the same part in the Russian village as Monsieur le Curé is playing in the Belgian or in the French countryside. The "pope" is a poor man, living with and for the peasants; he has hardly any class feeling as a priest.

Finally, as to bureaucracy, it will of course be willing to serve its old master, if it sees any advantage in so doing. But Russian bureaucracy, I was told, is as a class a proletariat, badly paid, therefore corruptible; but without any feeling of devotion at all to the patron's person. As le conventionnel, nay, le régicide—as Fouche served Napoleon and later even the Bourbons, as they had served Danton and Robespierre before, because it was natural to them to serve, provided they were paid for their services; likewise the chinovnik will probably serve the new régime, whichever it may be. It is only due to him to add that of course in both cases he will have the legitimate feeling of serving Russia.

There is then no immediate likelihood of any monarchist reaction, provided of course that no unforeseen events—a long war with serious defeats, a violent revolution with extreme social reforms—trouble the development. It seems as if the Romanoffs are finally made away with.

What is Russia to do with the dynasty? This is a most thorny problem, and the fate of Mary Stuart, of Charles the First and of Louis XVI, shows how often it has ended in tragedy. Provisionally they will probably be kept under strict supervision in Russia. When peace has come, and when the constitutional problem has received its final solution, they will probably be invited to emigrate.

In a review of the forces now dominating the situation, we have to consider separately the Duma, the new Government, the Council of Workmen and Soldiers, the army and the peasants.
Politically, the new Government is supreme and sovereign: everything is decided by their decrees, even the regulations for the Constituent Assembly will be fixed in this way. To an outsider the political extinction of the Duma is a puzzle. There is a juridical reason: the Duma, convoked by the Tsar and—according to certain theories at any rate,—not an independent parliamentary assembly, but only a sort of consultative body for legislative matters, may perhaps be considered as being extinct with the extinction of Tsarism. Efremoff said it was a very difficult question to decide whether the Duma was really still a legally existing institution. As a matter of fact, the Upper Chamber, the Council of Empire, has altogether ceased to exist. Of course in a revolution the doubt might be easily removed through the Duma’s constituting itself as the representative of the people. But this has not been done, and will not be done for a plain political reason: the Duma in its present composition is too reactionary a body to be able to cooperate officially in the work of the revolution. Its decisions would not be tolerated by the democratic forces now so strong. Therefore the Duma has no official sittings. The members are meeting in conference. Its Executive Committee is in close cooperation with the Government, and most of its members are delegated to control the administration, both central and local, to go to the front in order to address the soldiers, to supervise the imperial family, etc. But above all the Duma is exercising a representative function. It plays the part of the constitutional monarch in a parliamentary state; the Duma is the symbol of national unity; to it the regiments are coming to receive their benediction before leaving for the front. The large Catharina Hall in the palace of the Duma was resounding with patriotic speeches and with the Marsillaise, while Rodzianko and the other members of the Executive Committee received deputations and addressed processions.

Enough has been said as to the personal ability of the new Government. It has from the beginning had the character of a coalition Government, and this will be still more pronounced, if, as some papers here announce, two more socialists besides Keryenski have been nominated. One of these, Plekhanoff, is a very able man, and what is important just now, he is for an energetic prosecution of the war. The other socialist minister is unknown to me.

The Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Council

The entrance of these two new ministers in the Government is a symptom of the growing influence of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Council. It is necessary to say some words on this institution, which is of a pronounced revolutionary character, both in its origin and its organization. It was created at the very beginning of the revolution, each regiment or battalion, each factory sending a delegate to it. The Council soon swelled to such dimensions—at times between 1,500 and 2,000—that it became unmanageable. An Executive Com-
mittee was created, but this organ too became too big—about 100 members. At last a delegation of five was put at the helm, especially to cooperate with the Government.

It is evident that this organization must be a very loose one. And the bourgeois papers have not been slow in attacking the Council on this basis. Several of the members, and those the most loud-voiced, are neither workmen nor soldiers, but professional socialist leaders, like the advocate Skobeleff. The Rietch asked one day, in a very pointed article, from whom the different members had their powers; some light and some public control might be healthy, it was added. As a matter of fact, and quite naturally, the Council members would hardly all of them be able to point to unchallengeable warrants. And its representative character is being seriously impaired: many industrial workmen, after having got their eight hour day, no longer meet; the soldiers are more and more leaving for the front. The membership is at the best a changing one, and the institution in general of an exceptional character. It might therefore be supposed that in the long run it would perhaps be superseded.

There are, however, some conditions which will probably work for its maintenance. As already said, the workmen and soldiers have paid for the revolution; they know this and they wish to insist on a right of control. Besides the movement for organization of like councils has spread through all Russia, and even through the army. It seems as if there will be a sort of national basis, which though imperfect, will of course prop up the mother Council. Finally the stream of exiled revolutionaries now returning to Russia, whose names have been hallowed by their courage and sufferings, and who on their arrival in Russia at once rally to the Council, will add new luster to its otherwise waning consideration. It must also be said that this institution perhaps is a safety valve, through the opportunity it offers for public discussion. The fact that the delegation of five is cooperating with the Government, must also inspire a certain feeling of responsibility. On the other hand, the conviction is very strong among the democrats and socialists forming the Council, that the Government must be controlled and kept to its task of pursuing a clear democratic policy. There is here matter for serious conflicts, and the path of the revolution is certainly beset with difficulties. But there are also signs pointing to the possibility of a slow liquidation of these difficulties, and the latest news from Russia before this writing (April 20) is of very good augury. It seems as if the Council is prepared to leave the whole direction of affairs in the hands of the Government. About the special question of the leanings within the Council towards a separate peace, I shall say some words further on.

The Army

I come next to the army, an all-important factor in the present situation. It was the Petrograd garrison that determined the course of the revolution itself,
and it will be remembered that the program of the new Government stated as one of the conditions of the settlement that the troops now forming the Petrograd garrison shall remain there. This was a means of security to the new order of things, as these troops could be relied upon; it was also a privilege to the troops. Among these soon spread a certain spirit of anarchy, mistaken ideas of applying democratic ideas to military organization. The soldiers would not salute their officers, which was of small importance; they obtained the right of smoking everywhere—still more innocent; but they also insisted on electing their officers, which might have been dangerous, especially during war. These ideas began spreading to other parts of the army, and the generals at the front began to be afraid that the discipline might give way, and that in the face of the enemy.

This danger was so evident that it carried its own remedy in itself. The Government, moreover, with great adroitness used the danger as a means to rally round it the whole of public opinion. On March 21/8 the Riet ch published a leading article (really written by Milyukoff) which in very serious words pointed to the danger of the Riga front being attacked. It was evident to everybody able to read between the lines, that if the danger had been very grave, they would not have dared to speak so openly about it. But on the simple minds the effect was immediate. The cry “Hannibal ante muros” soon resounded everywhere, in all orations, in all the press leaders. Duma members were dispatched to the front to insist on unity and on military discipline. This was most urgent. At Kronstadt and at Helsingfors especially, the marines had committed most deplorable excesses.

The salutary effects of the new movement were soon evident. The troops at Petrograd began to ask to be sent to the front, and it was settled that the regiments should be used as recruiting and training bodies, while the men forming them were dispatched to the active army. I saw thousands of young recruits being trained before the Winter Palace and on the Champ de Mars, while a continual stream of regiments were marched through the streets, their bands playing the Marseillaise and the red banners carrying inscriptions like these: “Confidence in the Provisional Government”; “The War to be waged for a Peace worthy of Russia.” The men began saluting the officers in the street, and the workers in the munition factories resolved to work extra hours, in order to make up for the shortcomings of the war industry.

There is no doubt that when at the end of March (new style) I left Petrograd, the Government was much more firmly seated in its saddle than a fortnight before. Both Keryenski and Milyukoff said to me: “The most critical moments have passed.” And the Swedish socialist leader Branting, an exceptionally able and intelligent man, who has just been here after having passed his Easter holiday at Petrograd, confirms my impression. Branting had been much more in the circles of socialist workmen and soldiers than myself. His estimate
of Keryenski was extraordinarily high. The fate of Russia's future would chiefly hang on this young man.

Problems of the Future

The first problem which had to be solved was the re-victualling of Petrograd. If the capital was again placed in danger of famine, new riots would be inevitable. I have said that great progress was observed under this head during my stay already, partly of course because the scarcity had been artificially created. In the city itself great stores were discovered, in part in the houses of the late ministers.

The provision problem, both for the towns and for the army, is chiefly a question of transportation; besides the maximum prices, recently introduced, do not tempt the producers to sell, especially because of the depreciation of Russian money. Nekrasoff and Chingareff between them have a very complicated problem to solve. Perhaps American and English specialists may help to create a new method in the administration of Russian railways. Some lines are already run by Englishmen.

The Constituent Assembly

The next big question, besides the prosecution of the war, is the organization and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

The Government program says the Assembly was to meet "as soon as possible." I suppose the ministers are likely to put the stress on the last word. Indeed, I hardly spoke with one bourgeois politician without his shaking his head over the impossibility of coordinating the working of this Assembly with the active prosecution of the war. They therefore sincerely hope to see the end of the war in the autumn. But if the end does not come, they are likely to insist on the necessity of postponing the Assembly. On the other hand, the more extreme elements wish to strike the iron while it is hot, and the last proclamation from the Council requests the immediate organization of the Assembly. The premier, Prince Lvoff, has said it was to meet within a period of at least three, at most six months. The problem is not only one of organization: for instance, how are the soldiers at the front to vote, the vote being not only the act of putting a ballot in a box, but a method of contributing to form a real public opinion on a series of very grave questions; but there is also the serious difficulty of having a deliberative Assembly sitting discussing intricate constitutional and social problems, while the greatest war in history is being waged at the frontier. Indeed, it is highly to be desired that the bloodshed might come to an early end, if for no other reason, lest the future of Russia should be compromised.

As to the future constitution, there is officially and outwardly absolute unanimity: the cadets, even the progressives, have put the democratic republic
on their program. Indeed, no sane politician, at the present juncture, considers any other solution as possible. Monarchy, and especially the dynasty, are compromised beyond remedy; none of the Grand Dukes is to be thought of as Tsar, because it would imply dangerous family connections. But bourgeois politicians are far from enthusiastic republicans. They see the danger in such an enormous empire passing at one single step from an autocracy to a republic, and they are not blind to the advantages of monarchy, as a symbol of the unity and the indivisibility of the nation. This does not imply any sentimentalism towards the little father, and I was told that the existence of this sentiment even among the peasants was greatly exaggerated. There was only cool political calculation in it. Efremoff went to the length of saying to me: “If we only had had a very popular general—” This would seem a most dangerous experiment. And I know that Milyukoff and other cadet leaders reluctantly approved of the republic being admitted to their program.

I imagine that the solution contemplated is a sort of federal republic, based on the nationalities and races within the enormous empire as constituent parts, probably supplemented with local divisions in the Great Russian provinces. This solution, more or less on American lines; can, as in the United States, be combined with a strong executive power. It sounds like a prophecy that the American constitution has sometimes been defined as a “tsaristic” republic.

Already the governmental program had outlined large liberties of speech, of association, even of strike—the first instance, I believe, in history. The last point is of special importance to the industrial workman, and through his participation in the revolution he has also obtained another advantage: the eight-hour day. It is interesting to note that one of the Frères Nobel expressly stated that they were delighted with the result of this régime. Its efficiency was better than the former one with the long hours, which had tempted to passivity and even to sabotage.

The Agrarian Problem

These problems of industry are, however, not by far so important to Russia as the all dominating agrarian problem, which will absorb a great part of the activity and the interests of the Constituent Assembly. In his heart of hearts, every Russian is an agriculturist, in his dreams a landed proprietor. “Land and Liberty,” was written on every second red banner. The soldiers, peasants themselves or peasants’ sons, voiced this desire, and everybody realized that it had to be satisfied on a very large scale.

The state of the Russian countryside during the war is very curious, and in a certain respect an unexpected one. The absolute prohibition of vodka—very strictly executed; in the Petrograd hotels I saw no stronger drink than kvass, a sort of ginger beer—has stopped the chief expense of the peasants toward luxury; the soldiers’ wives and mothers receive governmental support; the
absence of workmen creates a great demand for laborers, with a consequent rise of wages: all this combines to create an unknown prosperity in the villages. The peasant girls were able to buy a greater number of those gowns which, hanging new and not yet used in the large wardrobe, are to impress their suitors. They were now said to decline work offered to them with the remark: "I have got gowns enough." The peasants, among them the soldiers, on returning from the front or from captivity, will be able to buy land. On the other hand, the great landowners are often unable to work their fields because of the scarcity of labor. They will therefore be willing to sell land. So far all seems well. The danger is that there may be ideas of the laborer's right to own the land he now tills. There will be hot debates about the principle of expropriation and its application. The landowners will say: Why shall landed property alone be considered as more or less liable to confiscation? Why not as well the industrial plant, or personal property? Fortunately, immense tracts of land will be at the disposal of the nation in the form of public domains or of land belonging to the monasteries. Here thousands on thousands of peasants can be made proprietors without any great difficulty, and means can perhaps be found of financing also the transfer of private land from the great owners to small holders. Everybody, however, will see the great seriousness of this problem and its bearing on the future of Russia. In this new class of small farmers new Russia will find the basis of its democracy, just as the French Revolution found it for France.

When now I pass to the racial and nationality problems, I approach already the numerous questions hanging on the problem of peace and war.

The Government program proclaimed the abolition of all disabilities for racial and religious reasons. This principle, loyally executed, will automatically take away the sting in the otherwise so thorny questions of delimitation within the Empire, especially in the west, where on the wide plains the different nationalities, Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Ests and other Baltic races, merge imperceptibly one into the other, or in the Caucasus, where the motley diversity is as great. No doubt, however, there will still be great difficulties in this respect, and more especially this will be the case with the Jews. I had no special opportunity of studying the Semitic problem, and therefore shall only give one piece of information, which shows on one hand, its acuteness, on the other, the apprehensions as to the future.

The leading inspirer of the Cadets is said to be an Israelitic Petrograd barrister, Vinaver, a close friend of Milyukoff's and an exceptionally able man. The Government had nominated him a Senator, member of the High Court, but he declined, because he would not expose the revolution to the risk of being dubbed a "Semitic machination." Generally the Jews took up an attitude of great reserve. Pogroms were still considered as possible.

To return to the problems of nationality, there are two questions under this head which require special treatment, namely, Finland and Poland.
The complete liberation of Finland, the reverse of all laws and decrees issued contrary to the Finnish constitution, and the proclamation of the right of the Finnish people to decide, through their own representatives, the future relations between Finland and Russia, was on one hand the fulfillment of an old pledge from Russian liberals to the Finns. Especially Milyukoff, Rodicheff, now Secretary of State for Finland, and Stakhovitch, now Governor General, had engaged themselves strongly on this line. It was, moreover, a sort of morning gift to Western Democracy, which has always taken a special interest in progressive Finland. And it was, last, but not least—a stroke of generous and far-sighted policy against the German machinations in Finland, which surely in certain contingencies might have been extremely dangerous; Finland is the glacis of Petrograd.

It is no secret that during the war numerous young Finns have crossed the frontier to go to Germany, where hundreds of them have been trained as officers to lead an eventual Finnish insurrection. It is said that thousands of young men in Finland itself have been equipped in secret for military service: two pairs of boots, a winter coat, a gun, etc. But it was understood that no movement was to be initiated if the Germans did not succeed in throwing artillery across the Gulf of Finland. Hence the extreme importance of the Riga front.

This movement chiefly found its adherents among the Swedish party in Finland, a political fraction decidedly on the wane, but still important because of its strong intellectual and economic position. However, only part of them favored this policy of despair, which really amounted to a driving out of the devil by Beelzebub. Some adherents were also said to have come from the "Old Fennomans," a conservative party which often has been very weak-kneed towards Russia. Their belief in authority as the supreme prop of social life may have brought some of them to admire the Prussian spirit.

The generous action on the part of the new Government doubtless has removed the ground from under this movement. It is explicable, however, that these ideas did not die at once; some may still nourish them. But I was told during my short stay at Helsingfors and in my subsequent conversations with Dr. Törngren, a very active and intelligent Finnish politician and publicist, during our common journey to Sweden, that what remained of this way of thinking in Finland, might be considered as a negligible quantity.

I saw some of the members of the new Finnish Government, among them Mr. Tokoi, the first socialist premier of any European country. As he does not speak Swedish, and myself not Finnish, we conversed in English, he having passed thirteen years in Canada as a carpenter. After his return to Finland, he became the head of the national federation of trade unions, and this activity prepared him for political life. His authority is great also outside his own party.
He was chiefly concerned about the problem of re-victualling the country. I also saw an old friend of mine, Professor Setälä, leader of the Young Finns, now Minister of Public Instruction. There is no doubt that the best intentions prevail, both on the Finnish and the Russian side, of arriving at a working arrangement between the two countries. On the Russian side the presence of Rodicheff, of Stakhovitch as Governor General, with Baron Korff, a jurist of wide knowledge and a European outlook, as the Governor's aide de camp, guarantees this. And the Finns very well see the realities of the problem: that Russia and Finland are indissoluble for plain geographical reasons. It would be sheer insanity for Finland to rely on the support of Germany, from which it is divided by the sea, while Russia dominates its entire land frontier to the east, and the Russian capital is situated at a distance of some few miles. Moreover, Finnish industrial merchandise and dairy produce are dependent on the Russian market.

But the Finns do not desire their country to be merged in the Russian Empire as one of its constituent parts. They demand a separate existence, a Finnish state at Russia's side, united with the Empire through a sort of loose union, giving to Russia only the direction of foreign affairs. The problem is a delicate one, besides entirely new in the history of constitutional law, if Russia is to become a republic; and as the Finns are a difficult race to treat with, tenacious, sometimes revengeful, it may tax the powers of statesmen on both sides.

Poland

The proclamation from the Russian Government to the Poles is the highest bid made during the war for the sympathies of this people, who after a tragedy of more than a hundred years, can at last look forward with certainty to a future of political independent life for part, if not for the whole of the race. This bid is not only a clever diplomatic device, made to win the sympathy of the Poles; it is a sincere application of the principle of nationalities. The Russians of course wish to see a reunited Poland, including the Polish—but not the Ukrainian—part of Galicia, the whole of Posnania and the Polish parts of Silesia and West Prussia. Only this enumeration suffices to show what problems will be raised in connection with this program. Germany is far from entertaining any idea of this sort. But if an independent Poland were formed, say out of Russian Poland and Western Galicia, it would certainly exercise a most powerful attraction on the Poles in the Prussian irredenta. It is incomprehensible how Austria and Germany have been capable of creating their "Kingdom of Poland" after the experience of Austria with an Italian and a Servian irredenta. The need for Polish soldiers must have been enormous indeed.

Many will of course doubt the sincerity of Russia in giving full freedom of action to the Poles as to the future of their new state. I had an opportunity of discussing the question with Efremoff, now a member of the Executive
Committee, consequently in close touch with the Government, and his opinion was that after all an entirely independent Poland would perhaps represent the best solution for Russia. A buffer state might be useful against Germany, though he saw the danger of the absence of military frontiers, if the principle of international anarchy were still to prevail. But he moreover added that a complete severance from Poland would present certain inner advantages to Russia. Polish nobles had bought land in Russia, and they were hard masters to the Russian peasants. Many Poles had obtained high situations in Russian administration, and after a very short time their offices had been filled with Poles. It is curious to observe this animosity against a seemingly subject race which has been able to obtain a superior social position. There are parallels in the relation between English and Scots, between English and Irish.

It goes without saying that full separation would raise most difficult problems—Polish industry is dependent on the Russian market; a tariff arrangement would at any rate be necessary. A connection between Poland and Germany would spell economic ruin to Polish industry, as it could not withstand German competition. For this reason alone no Pole in his senses can have seriously entertained the idea of looking westward.

In any case, whether the solution is to be one of complete separation, or one of a connection with Russia, there will be the most difficult problems of delimitation. While the Poles probably will demand both Ukrainian and Lithuanian land, as having belonged to their ancient kingdom, Russia will insist on these provinces forming part of the new republic, and these people are likely to prefer the latter solution. Polish domination was always unpopular; the Russians are much more easy-going. I should add that I have had no opportunity of discussing these questions with the Poles themselves, and it is evident that they will have something to say in the matter.

Problems of War and Peace

War provoked the revolution in Russia. The menace from the enemy disciplines the revolutionary elements, obliging them to rally round the Government. In both respects the war may be considered as a boon to Russia: the country has had a return for its enormous sacrifices. But it is evident to all who know history that a long continued war would prove fatal to the revolution and to the work of liberation and reorganization within. A Napoleon might be born in Russia, too.

In Russia,—the wish may be the father of the thought,—nearly everybody I spoke to believed in an end of the war in the course of this year. Milyukoff predicted it with the greatest assurance. I had not the courage to express my doubts on this point. I am afraid we may still be in the middle of this terrible tragedy.
There is no doubt that Russia is still able,—from an exclusively military point of view,—to prosecute the war. Its offensive powers are impaired through lack of munitions and guns. But the new régime has at any rate done away with the artificial impediments created by the late Government and the dynasty, and Russia still disposes of great reserves in man-power—it was said about forty divisions, at least one million of fully trained men besides the young recruits now being trained, and one year gives another million—and in officers; especially there is a large reserve of cavalry officers who might be used also as leaders of infantry. Besides, a potential reserve is to be found in young cultivated Jews, who have been trained as soldiers, but have not been permitted to serve as officers. They would be able—if need be—to act as garrison officers and in other subsidiary military situations.

The financial position is of course far from good. The debt is enormous, the paper money flooding the country is daily increasing in bulk, and the foreign exchange is deplorable, because the exports have practically ceased. But economically speaking, the position of Russia is probably better than that of any other European country now at war. Agriculture is Russia’s chief pursuit; in consequence it is suffering far less than highly industrialized countries like Great Britain, Germany or France. It can find within its own borders next to everything it may want. The problem is one of transportation and of organization.

Russia, then, can certainly go on with the war for years still. And its present Government is firmly determined to remain true to the London agreement, and to conclude peace only in common with the other allies. It must not be forgotten that the support of the Western Powers was decisive for the very success of the “miraculous” revolution; that Russia financially is dependent on France and Great Britain, tied to them by “golden chains.” The Government and the Duma both are bent on prosecuting the war as one of liberation for Europe in general. Russia has freed itself; now Germany and Austria are to follow suit. This is a conception common to bourgeois liberals and to socialist workingmen. Both regard the two Central Powers as the props of reaction in Europe. The middle classes and the peasants moreover consider the war as a means of liberation from the commercial domination of Germany, which was established by the treaty of 1907.

There is besides a not unimportant group in Russia which has positive war aims, and its spokesman is the foreign minister, Milyukoff. From the beginning of the war he has proclaimed that it was a vital condition to Russia to get the full domination of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. A neutralization or internationalization would, according to him, not be sufficient, as in that case the Black Sea might become a theater of war, and consequently Russia might be obliged to fortify the coasts and build a strong fleet. If Russia got the Dardanelles, a fortification on this spot alone would be sufficient. According to
Milyukoff, Russia's interest, better than through neutralization, would be served by Turkey, or another feeble state, keeping the Straits.

This line of argument calls for two observations: it reasons on the basis of the old order of things in international affairs, and it is decidedly nationalistic. It altogether waives the interests of Roumanians: this ally of Russia's would be completely throttled from a maritime point of view; it has no other outlet to the sea except that on the Black Sea. The Danube would offer no real compensation.

It is, however, a great question whether Milyukoff's view is shared by so large and powerful sections of Russian public opinion that it will become a national demand on the part of Russia, provided of course that the dice of war fall so as to enable Russia to enforce its claim in this respect. Keryenski told me that the Government as a whole was content with neutralization. "Milyukoff does not dare to raise this question now." He has done it later, though, in an interview given to the press, and here he also raised the question, which plays so prominent a part in the note of the Allies of January 11, of a reconstruction of the Danube monarchy, an erection of a Czecho-Slovak state, the agrandizement of Servia and of Roumania. I do not quite understand the origin of this interview—I wonder whether it was not given to the press some time ago, and its publication delayed for some reason. For it is really completely overruled by the all-important Declaration of the Government, signed by Prince Lvoff, and published on April 11. It is here expressly stated that "Free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, nor will it deprive any people of its legitimate heritage nor occupy foreign territory, but that its ambition is to create a lasting peace on the basis of the independence of the nations and their full and free disposal of their own destinies." This implies that it must be left to Czechs and Slovaks, to Serbs and Roumanians, to decide themselves how they can best work out their proper salvation.

I have the very strong impression from my numerous conversations both with political men and with ordinary men and women in Russia, that nobody's heart is throbbing quicker at the thought of the Dardanelles flying the Russian flag, or of orthodox service being celebrated in Agia Sophia. The same thing can certainly be said, and with stronger emphasis, as to the future fate of Austria-Hungary. Most Russians were of opinion that Russia had won so immensely through its revolution that it could now forego all imperialist dreams; Russia was to be a factor for peace. It is the same line of argument which is running through the Government Declaration.

It is evident that this document is the outcome of negotiations between the Government and the Council of Workmen and Soldiers. It is virtually a compromise. On the one hand, it indirectly condemns Milyukoff's nationalist program; on the other, it still more strongly protests against any idea of a separate peace.
The Government says in so many words that "all questions concerning the war and its conclusion must be finally settled in close cooperation with our allies." A similar declaration has later been issued by the Council of Workmen and Soldiers; they also expressly pronounce against the idea of a separate peace.

This idea has been mooted from the left wing of the socialists, but it is an error to think that it is a separate peace, say between Russia and Germany, or between Russia and both the Central Powers, which is proposed. This extreme section of the socialists is aiming at a general peace; and,—what should not be forgotten,—peace on a condition which hardly would suit the German or the Austro-Hungarian Government. They demand that the soldiers and workmen on the other side imitate their example by making a revolution. This is the conception underlying the articles in the extreme socialist paper, the Pravda (Truth). "Under their revolutionary red banners, the Russian soldiers should go against their German brethren. These will not hesitate to go to meet us under the same ensign." This article appeared on March 23. Two or three days later, another article explained that the former had been misinterpreted. The writer (he was said to be Leonid Anderieff, the author), had meant to say that the Russian soldiers should fasten the red flag to their bayonets on marching against the Germans; if the Germans did not meet them in the same way, they were to use the bayonets. There is here no real foundation for a policy. And the Russian socialist, who has fought against the Tsar, sees a still greater and more dangerous enemy in Wilhelm.

The Russian socialists who have lately returned from Switzerland,—Lenine is their leader,—have been handicapped by the fact that they were allowed to pass through Germany, and it is doubtful whether they will command any serious influence. To resume: there seems at present to be no likelihood at all of any serious section of Russian public opinion really supporting the idea of a separate peace, and even the conception of a general peace is subordinated to conditions as to the inner state of things in the Central Powers, which as yet can not be said to exist.

There is no more fascinating problem than to ponder over the moral effect on Germany of the Russian revolution. There can be no doubt that it must tell seriously on the will to prosecute the war. It must not be forgotten that the German people entered the war as one waged against Tsardom and Russian barbarism. There is no more a Tsar to fight against. The professional military men of course see the revolution as an element of weakness. This was the great error of Austria and Prussia in 1792, too. Of course the revolution at first provoked disorganization. Stokhod was the result. But it is quite possible that Russia may, even from a military point of view, undergo a regeneration and its soldiers fight with stronger impulse than before, though our industrialized, scientific war bears a different character from that of a hundred years ago. The German people at any rate will see no reason to continue a war against a Russian
democracy; it is, on the other hand, evident that they now consider England as the chief enemy.

The other psychological effects are of a more subtle order. The Germans and in general the peoples of the Central Powers, can not fail to ask why their political system is to remain more reactionary than that of the entire world. The Easter message of the Kaiser tries to satisfy this craving, but its timid proposal of adjourning the question can hardly satisfy. The ever true history of the Sibylline books may repeat itself, and he who did not know how to give liberally in time, will perhaps see his later offers scornfully refused. At any rate the Chancellor's position must be almost compromised. He had to rely, against the Tirpitz faction, always dangerous, on the liberal and socialist parties; they have been estranged by the refusal of immediate political reforms. Bethmann-Hollweg may one day find himself between two chairs.

Combined with America's entry into the war, with the ever widening circle of enemies, with no friends outside the allies, and these partly sulky and discontented, the impression of the Russian revolution must sap the roots of moral fiber in Germany. Of late the telegrams announce riots in Berlin. One would have denied the possibility of a revolution in Germany. Sometimes the unexpected happens.

Such an event would completely change the face of things. But it would be idle to reason on the base of such a hypothesis.

There is no doubt that great fighting powers are still left in the Germans. They will at any rate be capable of stubborn resistance, and last not least, this resistance will be fired to violent flames, if the other side insists on extreme demands: cession of territory which the Germans consider as German ground, and which impartial opinion must own is German; subjection to vexatious restrictions with regard to foreign trade and to colonial expansion. It must be the hope of every good European that in this respect American influence will be one of moderation and of wise counsel.

April 20, 1917.
PUBLICATIONS OF THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

The chief agency of propaganda adopted by the Trustees is by publications bearing the imprint of the Endowment. The list of these publications is already large, and some of the earlier pamphlets and monographs are now out of print. In the following list these are included; the publications no longer available for distribution being thus indicated (†).

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The Endowment has established depository libraries for all its publications in the larger cities of the United States, where they may be consulted. A list of these depository libraries is included in the Year Book for 1917.

Additional publications will be announced from time to time.

Publications of the Secretary’s Office

†Year Book for 1911; Year Book for 1912; Year Book for 1913–1914; Year Book for 1915; Year Book for 1916; Year Book for 1917.

Publications of the Division of Intercourse and Education

†No. 2 German International Progress in 1913. By Professor Dr. Wilhelm Paszkowski. iii—11 p. 1914.  
No. 3 Educational Exchange with Japan. By Dr. Hamilton W. Marie. 8 p. 1914.  
†No. 4 Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. IX—418 p., Illus., maps. 1914.  
†No. 5 Intellectual and Cultural Relations Between the United States and the Other Republics of America. By Dr. Harry Erwin Bard. iv—35 p. 1914.  
No. 8 The Same, in the Original Spanish, Portuguese and French. viii—221 p. 1915.  
A second edition of Mr. Bacon’s Report, containing Nos. 7 and 8 in one volume, has also been published.

No. 9 Former Senator Burton’s Trip to South America. By Otto Schoenrich. iii—40 p. 1915.


No. 11 Hygiene and War; Suggestions for Makers of Textbooks and for Use in Schools. By George Ellis Jones, Ph.D. 1917.


Publications of the Division of Economics and History


**Publications of the Division of International Law**


*The Hague Court Reports, comprising the awards, accompanied by syllabi, the agreements for arbitration, and other documents in each case submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and to commissions of inquiry under the provisions of the Conventions of 1899 and 1907 for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Edited by James Brown Scott. cxi—664 p. 1916. Price, $3.50.


*The Declaration of Independence; the Articles of Confederation; the Constitution of the United States. Edited, with an Introductory Note, by James Brown Scott, Director. 124 p. 1917. Price to be announced.

**Pamphlet Series**

No. 1 Arbitrations and Diplomatic Settlements of the United States. vii—21 p.

No. 2 Limitation of Armament on the Great Lakes. The report of John W. Foster, Secretary of State, December 7, 1892. vii—57 p. 1914.

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INSTITUT AMÉRICAIN DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. Historique, Notes, Opinions. 1—153 p. 1916. Price, $1.00.


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